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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Mark Wayne Cornelison appeals from the summary dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Cornelison pled guilty to felony DUI with a persistent violator
enhancement. (R., p. 171.) The district court sentenced him to 20 years with 10
years determinate. (R., pp. 191-94.) He initiated the current action by filing a
petition for post-conviction relief.

(R., pp. 5-8.)

In his petition, Cornelison

asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to
suppress evidence of a blood draw.

(R., p. 7.)

In his affidavit, Cornelison

included allegations that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately argue
mental health at sentencing. (R., pp. 15-16.)
The state filed an answer and a motion to dismiss. (R., pp. 60-67, 90-91.)
The district court granted the motion to dismiss, rejecting the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence gathered as
a result of a blood draw “because Cornelison cannot show that such a motion, if
filed, would have succeeded.”

(R., pp. 270-77.)

The district court also

addressed, and dismissed, the “claim” of ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing.

(R., pp. 277-79.)

Cornelison appealed from the district court’s

judgment dismissing the case. (R., pp. 281, 287.)
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ISSUES
Cornelison states the issues on appeal as:
1.

District court erred in it’s interpretation of Line 6 of the parole
agreement, and by not reading the parole agreement in its
entirety, or as a whole.

2.

District court erred in it’s interpretation of facts in, State v.
Ellis, and failed to recognize that higher courts find parolee’s
do maintain some Federal Constitutional rights.

3.

District court failed to recognize Parolee’s ability to withdraw
consent to the Parole Agreement, as stated in Cornelison’s 4
page, hand written brief, dated the 16th day of January, and
marked received by court January 22. [Exhibit #4.]

4.

District court failed to recognize, and still fails to recognize
the date that Suzannes Cooper’s mental health report was
filed with court. [Exhibit #5.] Therefore, District court failed
to adequately rule on Cornelison’s mental health claim.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 8 (some capitalization altered, otherwise verbatim).)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Cornelison failed to show that the district court erred by concluding
counsel was not ineffective for electing to not file a motion to suppress evidence
because such a motion would not have been granted?
2.
Has Cornelison failed to show that the district court erred by concluding
counsel was not ineffective in relation to sentencing?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Cornelison Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Concluding
Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Electing To Not File A Motion To Suppress
Evidence Because Such A Motion Would Not Have Been Granted
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that Cornelison failed to establish a prima

facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to
suppress evidence of his blood draw because such a motion would not have
been granted.

(R., p. 270.)

Specifically, such a motion would have failed

because “Cornelison was out on parole at the time of the search in question, and
it is clear from the record that he waived his Fourth Amendment rights in his
parole agreement.” (R., pp. 275-76.) Application of the relevant legal standards
shows the district court’s analysis was correct.
B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).
C.

Cornelison Failed To Show Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Because
Any Motion To Suppress Would Necessarily Have Failed
To avoid summary dismissal, a post-conviction petitioner must present

admissible evidence making out a prima facie case as to each essential element
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of the claims upon which the petitioner bears the burden of proof. Adams v.
State, 158 Idaho 530, 537, 348 P.3d 145, 152 (2015); DeRushé v. State, 146
Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009); Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708,
710, 351 P.3d 636, 638 (Ct. App. 2015); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647,
873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). The elements of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim are deficient performance and prejudice.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

Strickland v.

Where a post-conviction petitioner

alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion, “a conclusion that
the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court is generally
determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test.” Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64,
67-68, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172-73 (Ct. App. 2011).

Here the district court

concluded that, if pursued, a motion to suppress evidence of the blood draw
would not have been granted. (R., pp. 270-76.) Application of relevant Fourth
Amendment legal standards supports the district court’s ruling.
“A person challenging a search has the burden of showing he or she had
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place to be searched.” State v.
Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008). To meet this burden
the moving party must demonstrate both “a subjective expectation of privacy in
the object of the challenged search” and that “society [is] willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable.” Id.
Parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy against
governmental intrusion.

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United

States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
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“[P]ersons conditionally released to

societies have a reduced expectation of privacy, thereby rendering intrusions by
government authorities ‘reasonable’ which otherwise would be unreasonable or
invalid under traditional constitutional concepts.” State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho
841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987). Thus, “the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.”
Samson, 547 U.S. at 856.
Here it was “undisputed that Cornelison was out on parole at the time of
the search in question, and it is clear from the record that he waived his Fourth
Amendment rights in his parole agreement.” (R., p. 275.) Condition 6 of his
parole agreement “required Cornelison to ‘freely cooperate and voluntarily submit
to medical and chemical tests and examinations for the purpose of determining if
parolee is using, or under the influence of alcohol or narcotics ….’” (R., p. 276.)
“Such waiver included ‘medical and chemical tests and examinations for the
purpose of determining if parolee is using, or under the influence of alcohol,’
which is exactly what occurred with the blood draw in question.” (Id.) The district
court did not err in concluding that the motion to suppress would not have been
granted, and therefore Cornelison did not support a prima facie claim of either
deficient performance or prejudice.
II.
Cornelison Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Concluding Counsel
Was Not Ineffective In Relation To Sentencing
A.

Introduction
Cornelison alleged that, although the court at sentencing had the reports

of two psychologists, it lacked the report of Susanne Cooper, a clinical social
5

worker. (R., p. 15.) He claimed his attorney was ineffective for failing to seek a
continuance to present Cooper’s report (and that it had to be presented by a Rule
35 motion) and failing to “say anything about [his] mental health issues” at
sentencing. (R., pp. 15-16.) The district court found these claims disproved by
the record in the criminal case, because Cooper’s report was in fact before the
sentencing court and in denying the Rule 35 motion the sentencing judge stated
that mental health did not play a significant role because the sentence was
required to protect the community. (R., pp. 277-79.) Review shows the district
court was correct.
B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists, which, if resolved in petitioner’s favor, would require relief to be granted.
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The
Court freely reviews the district court’s application of the law. Id. at 434, 835
P.2d at 669. However, the Court is not required to accept either the applicant’s
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the
applicant’s conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110,
112 (2001).
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C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Record Disproved
Cornelison’s Allegations Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel At
Sentencing
“To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to
summary dismissal “if the applicant’s evidence raises no genuine issue of
material fact” as to each element of the petitioner’s claims. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c));
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.

“Allegations contained in the

application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly
disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a
matter of law.” Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802.
In order to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel,

a

post-conviction

petitioner

must

demonstrate

both

deficient

performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307
(1989). When a defendant claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion, “the district court may consider the probability of success of the motion in
question in determining whether the attorney’s inactivity constituted incompetent
performance.” Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App.
2011) (citing Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct.
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App.1996)). “Where the alleged deficiency is counsel’s failure to file a motion, a
conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial
court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test.” Id. at 6768, 266 P.3d at 1172-73.
The record supports the district court’s conclusion that Cornelison’s claim
that counsel was ineffective for not moving for a continuance so that Cooper’s
report could be submitted was disproved by the record. The district court in the
criminal case specifically found that Cooper’s report had been submitted on
November 21, 2013, four days before sentencing. (R., pp. 232-33; see also
#41715 Confidential Exhibits, pp. 75-89.1)

The record of the criminal case

disproved Cornelison’s claim.2
Likewise, Cornelison’s claim that counsel’s argument was ineffective is
disproven by the record. The mental health evidence was before the district
court, which considered it, but ultimately imposed the sentence it did to protect
the community. In denying the Rule 35 motion, the district court stated that “the

The appeal in the criminal case is Docket No. 41715. The district court took
judicial notice of the PSI in that case, although no copy of the PSI was introduced
in the record in this case. (R., pp. 118, 256, 278.)
1

Cornelison attempts to rebut the district court’s finding, made in the criminal
case, that it had the PSI addendum at the time of sentencing, by attaching a copy
of the addendum to his brief. (Appellant’s brief, p. 43.) Even if the procedural
bars to presenting new evidence to the appellate court were ignored, review of
the document attached to the brief shows that the “received” stamp is by the
Department of Correction. That the Department of Correction stamped a copy of
the addendum as received on November 25 does not rebut the district court’s
finding that the document was received by the court on November 21. (See
#41715 Confidential Exhibits, p. 75 (showing a court clerk received stamp of
November 21, 2013).)
2
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Defendant’s mental health status was but one of many factors considered by the
Court in determining the proper sentence in this case” and that the court
“concluded that the Defendant presents a substantial risk to the Twin Falls
community.” (R., p. 234 (denial of Rule 35 motion).) Because the district court in
the criminal case specifically found it had considered the mental health evidence
presented and concluded that Cornelison was a substantial risk to the community
based on his horrible record of drinking and driving, the district court in the postconviction case rightly concluded that Cornelison’s claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel in failing to argue mental health more in sentencing was disproven by
the record.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary dismissal
of Cornelison’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 25th day of January, 2016.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of January, 2016, caused
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
MARK WAYNE CORNELISON
INMATE #64354
I.S.C.I.
P. O. BOX 14
BOISE, ID 83707

KKJ/dd

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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